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Abstract
In a global context foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration
substitute one another in the matching process between workers and
ﬁrms. However, as labor ﬂows can lead to the formation of business
networks, migration can actually facilitate FDI in the long-run. We
ﬁrst present a stylized model for a small open economy illustrating
these oﬀsetting eﬀects. We then use U.S. data on bilateral labor in-
ﬂows and capital outﬂows to measure the extent of contemporaneous
substitutability and dynamic complementarity between migration and
FDI. We ﬁnd that brain drain and FDI inﬂows are negatively corre-
lated contemporaneously but that skilled migration is associated with
future increases in FDI inﬂows. We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence of
substitutability between current migration and FDI for migrants with
secondary education, and of complementarity between past migration
and FDI for unskilled migrants.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last few decades have seen a tremendous increase in the international
movements of factors and goods, with international trade and factor ﬂows
growing much more rapidly than output. Grossly, the growth rate of inter-
national trade has been twice that of world output between 1990 and 2000;
even more remarkable is the growth of global FDI ﬂows, which has been
triple the growth rate of international trade ﬂows over the period. While
such growth has been faster in some regions than others, it has not been
localized in just one or two regions, as shown in Figure 1.G l o b a lﬁgures for
international migration are less easy to obtain because of poor data quality
and lack of international harmonization in the deﬁnition of a migrant (Zlotny,
1998). International migration is clearly on the rise, however, as reﬂected for
example by the fact that the total number of foreign-born individuals resid-
ing in OECD countries (i.e., the OECD immigration stock) has increased by
50% over the same period. The latter ﬁgure is amazing because in contrast
to the liberalization trend that has characterized trade and FDI, restrictive
immigration policies have instead been introduced by most receiving coun-
tries with the double objective of decreasing the quantity and increasing the
quality of immigration (Faini, 2004). Only the second of these objectives has
been achieved; indeed, the number of highly-skilled immigrants (foreign-born
individuals with tertiary education) living in an OECD member country has
increased by 70% between 1990 and 2000, but the number of low-skill mi-
grants has risen too, although at a lower pace (28%) (Docquier and Marfouk,
2004), as displayed in Figure 2.
This paper investigates whether migration and foreign direct investments
(FDI) are substitutes, as standard trade models would predict (either jobs
ﬂow to workers or workers to jobs) or complements, as recent socio-economic
literature on the role of diasporas in favoring capital inﬂows and technol-
ogy diﬀusion to the migrants’ origin countries would seem to suggest. In a
standard trade-theoretic framework, the relationship between migration and
trade as well as between migration and FDI is a relationship of substitutabil-
ity. Indeed, trade contributes to factor price equalization and therefore lowers
incentives for factor mobility; at the same time, factor movements (beyond
the Rybszinski cone) reduce price diﬀerentials and, hence, the scope for trade.
Similarly, capital is expected to ﬂow to where the type of labor used inten-
sively in production is abundant and, other things equal, workers will supply
their labor services where the highest salary can be obtained. Through such
2mechanisms, migration and FDIs are substitute ways to match workers and
employers located in diﬀerent countries. On the other hand, there is a grow-
ing literature emphasizing that migrant networks facilitate bilateral economic
transactions through their removing of informational and cultural barriers
between host and origin countries. Such a diaspora externality has long been
recognized in the sociological literature and, more recently, by economists
in the ﬁeld of international trade. In many instances indeed, and, as ex-
plained, in contrast to the predictions of standard trade models, trade and
migration appear as complements (e.g., Gould, 1994). Interestingly, such a
complementarity has been shown to prevail mostly for trade in heterogeneous
goods, where ethnic networks help overcoming information problems linked
to the very nature of the goods exchanged (Rauch and Casella, 2003, Rauch
and Trindade, 2002).
In a similar spirit, migration may also facilitate the formation of the
t y p e so fb u s i n e s sl i n k sw h i c hl e a dt oF D Ip r o j e c td e p l o y m e n ti nap a r t i c u l a r
location. Hence, while emigration of workers into a country may mitigate
to some extent the incentives for FDI from the host to the origin country
of migrants, their sheer presence in the host country can be a catalyst to
establish the required links to achieve eﬃcient distribution, procurement,
transportation and satisfaction of regulations. An important barrier to a
multinational corporation’s viability to set up a subsidiary in a developing
country can be uncertainty. To the extent that migrants integrate to the
business community, a network can emerge whereby migrants liaise between
potential investors and partners (both private and public) in various aspects
of setting up a production facility in the country of origin of the migrant.
Such mechanisms through which migration and FDI seem to complement
each thanks to migrants taking part in business networks are described in
various sectoral case-studies, notably in the case of the software industry
(Saxeenian, 2001, Arora and Gambardella, 2004, Commander et al., 2004b).
While the channel just described would seem to apply mainly to skilled mi-
grants, there are other channels through which unskilled migrants may also
contribute to relax information constraints on FDI. Indeed, their integration
into the host country labor market acts as a revelator of the characteristics
of the workforce in their home country and may therefore reduce uncertainty
and possibly remove any concern potential investors could have in this re-
spect. Hence, migration of both skilled and unskilled workers can facilitate in
3the long run the outﬂow of FDI from the destination to the origin country.1
How is the relationship of substitutability or complementarity between
migration and FDI aﬀected by the skill composition of migration and by the
pattern (i.e., sectoral composition) of FDI? Surprisingly, these issues have
so far been neglected in the literature. Focusing on the impact of trade
liberalization on migration in a cross-section of countries, Lopez and Schiﬀ
(1998) concluded to a relationship of complementarity between trade and
unskilled migration and to a relationship of substitutability between trade
and skilled migration, but did not analyze the pattern of migration in relation
to FDI. More recently, Aroca and Maloney (2002) analyzed the impact of FDI
on US-Mexico migration and concluded to a relationship of contemporaneous
substitutability between the two; however, they did not consider possible
dynamic relationships between the two, nor did they consider the possible
impact of migration on FDI. Finally, recent studies suggest that there are FDI
spillovers on upstream industries in developing countries (e.g., Kugler, 2000,
2005, Smarzynska, 2004). To the extent that such spillovers induce adoption
of more skill-intensive technologies, they may magnify the substitution eﬀect
between skilled migration and FDI.
On the whole, our working assumption is that the relationship between
migration and FDI is characterized by the oﬀsetting eﬀects of contempora-
neous substitutability and dynamic complementarity. In Section 2 we ﬁrst
present a stylized model that captures the main mechanisms through which
international labor and capital movements can be linked; the aim of this sim-
ple theoretical framework is to derive a number of predictions to be tested
empirically. Section 3 presents the data used for the empirical analysis; the
main data sources we use are US Census data on immigration stocks in 1990
and 2000, and data from the US Bureau on Economic Analysis on FDI out-
ﬂows. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy and presents the results.
These are broadly consistent with the predictions of the theoretical frame-
work in that skilled migration (brain drain) and FDI inﬂows are negatively
correlated contemporaneously but past skilled migration is associated with
an increase in current FDI inﬂows. We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence of sub-
stitutability between current migration and FDI for migrants with secondary
1If veriﬁed, this is another channel — alongside remittances, return migration, and the
eﬀect of migration prospects on education investment — through which skilled migration
aﬀects growth and welfare in the sending countries. See Rapoport and Docquier (2005) on
the growth eﬀects of remittances, and Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) on
return migration as a source of growth.
4education, and of complementarity between past migration and FDI for un-
skilled migrants. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Consider a small open developing economy where, at each period, a composite
good is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant
returns to scale:
Yt = A(Ht)K
1−α
t L
α
t
with Lt = NtHt, the stock of labor measured in eﬃciency units and Ht the
average number of such units (or average level of human capital) per worker.
In this setting, skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes and total
factor productivity depends on human capital externalities, as captured by
t h ee x p r e s s i o no ft h es c a l ef a c t o rA. Assuming competitive markets and
denoting by k the capital to labor ratio, factor returns are given by:
rt =( 1 − α)A(Ht)k
−α
t
wt = αA(Ht)k
1−α
The economy is ”open” in that capital is perfectly mobile internationally
and ”developing” in that, due to persistent technological gaps, the wage rate
(or wage per eﬃcient unit of labor) is higher in a more advanced economy
which represents a potential destination for migrants.2 By contrast, labor
is imperfectly mobile internationally due to the presence of migration costs
(possibility coupled to liquidity constraints that prevent proﬁtable migra-
tion investments) and to the fact that destination countries restrict immi-
gration both quantitatively and qualitatively (i.e., selective immigration pol-
icy). Wage-diﬀerentials, migration costs and immigration policy determine
the pattern of migration (i.e., whether there is self-selection or out-selection
and whether migrants have more or less than average skills).
International capital ﬂows are such that the domestic interest rate is equal
to the international interest rate augmented by a country-risk premium π
associated to internal factors such as risk, political instability, corruption,
individual freedom, degree of trade liberalization, quality of governance, etc.
2The destination country is assumed to be large. That is, its domestic prices and wages
are assumed to be unaﬀected by international factor ﬂows to/from one single country.
5With rt = r∗ + πt, we have, therefore:
kt =
"
(1 − α)A(Ht)
r∗ + πt
# 1
α
≡ k(πt,H t)
wt = α
· 1 − α
r∗ + πt
¸1−α
α
[A(Ht)]
1
α ≡ w(πt,H t)
with the derivatives k
0
1 < 0, k
0
2 > 0 and w
0
1 < 0,w
0
2 > 0.
The equilibrium stock of capital in the economy is thus given by:
Kt = ktLt =
"
(1 − α)A(Ht)Nα
t Hα
t
r∗ + πt
# 1
α
The latter expression allows us to envision the causal relationships between
migration and FDI that are the focus of our empirical analysis and to design
our empirical strategy accordingly.
The ﬁrst, immediate eﬀect of migration is to reduce the number of work-
ers (denoting by m the migration rate, it becomes Nt(1−m)); any migration
outﬂow would decrease the domestic return to capital and therefore gener-
ate a compensating outﬂow of capital; clearly, FDI and migration are here
substitutes as more migration leads to less FDI and conversely.
Second, the skill composition of migration is also of importance. As is
well known and documented, a skilled labor force is a key determinant of
FDI inﬂows as it contributes to the capacity of the home economy to adopt
new technologies, an eﬀect often referred to as the technological externality
arising from human capital formation.3 All else equal, a more skilled emigra-
tion lowers the proportion of skilled in the home population and, therefore,
through a decrease in H, should deter FDI. In terms of our notations, if the
post-migration level of human capital, Hm
t , is lower than the pre-migration
average level of human capital, Ht,t h i sa ﬀects capital inﬂows negatively in
two ways, through the stronger depletion of the stock of labor Lt and through
the human capital externality captured by A(Ht).
Third, as explained in the introduction, skilled migrants tend to take
part in business networks while unskilled migrants convey information on
the characteristics of the home country labor force. Hence, both types of
3See for example Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) for both a theoretical framework
and survey of the empirical literature on this issue.
6migration help overcoming informational barriers to FDI and therefore con-
tribute to increasing the attractiveness of the country to foreign investors.
We interpret this impact of emigration as a negative shock on the origin
c o u n t r yr i s kp r e m i u m( πt → πm
t ).
Finally, one must also bear in mind that education decisions are impacted
by the prospect of migration. Back in the 1970s, the ﬁrst generation of brain
drain models (e.g., Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, McCullock and Yellen,
1977) did recognize this but considered that destination (Western) countries
reaped all the beneﬁts from the induced increase in the international supply
of brains. It is only recently that, starting with Mountford (1997), Stark
et al. (1997, 1998), Vidal (1998) and Beine et al. (2001, 2003), a growing
literature has demonstrated that migration prospects can not only boost
domestic enrollment in higher education but also increase net human capital
formation at home.4 This suggests that the eﬀect of a more skilled emigration
on H and, therefore, on FDI inﬂows, could be ambiguous; indeed, one would
expect a detrimental brain drain to weaken the dynamic complementarity
between skilled migration and FDI emphasized above, and to strengthen it
instead in case of a beneﬁcial brain drain.
Notwithstanding this last, indirect eﬀect, the central predictions from
our stylized model are that all else equal, a larger and more skilled migration
network (given the additional impact of skilled migrants through their being
part of business networks) should encourage future FDI while contempora-
neous international factor movements should reﬂect a negative correlation
between labor outﬂows and capital inﬂows.
3D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
The main data sources we use are US Census data on immigration stocks
by country of origin and education level for 1990 and 2000, and data from
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis on FDI outﬂows by destination country
and sector (manufacturing vs. services). The stocks of migrants are classiﬁed
by the highest level of schooling attained grouped as primary, secondary or
tertiary education.
The estimates of US direct investment position abroad are valued at his-
torical cost and include international transactions between US. parent com-
4See Commander et al. (2004a) and Docquier and Rapoport (2004) for analytical
surveys of this literature.
7panies and their foreign aﬃliates for calendar years 1982-2001. International
transactions consist of capital outﬂows and its components (equity capital
outﬂows, reinvested earnings, and intercompany debt outﬂows); income; roy-
alties and license fees; and charges for other services. The data for 1982,
1989, and 1994 are universe values from benchmark surveys, adjusted from
the ﬁscal year basis on which the data were reported to a calendar year basis—
the basis required for the international transactions accounts. The data for
1983-88, 1990-93 and 1995-2001 are universe estimates that are the sum of
sample data reported in BEA’s quarterly surveys of US. direct investment
abroad plus an estimate of data for aﬃliates not reported in the quarterly
surveys. The estimates for unreported aﬃliates for 1983-88 are derived both
by extrapolating forward data reported for these aﬃliates in the 1982 bench-
mark survey based on the movement of the sample data in the subsequent
years, and by interpolating backwards between the 1989 and 1982 benchmark
surveys. The estimates for unreported aﬃliates for 1990-93 are derived by ex-
trapolating forward data reported for these aﬃliates in the 1989 benchmark
survey based on the movement of the sample data in the subsequent years.
Likewise, the estimates for unreported aﬃliates for 1995-2001 are derived by
extrapolating forward data reported for these aﬃliates in the 1994 bench-
mark survey based on the movement of the sample data in the subsequent
years.
Beginning with 1994, the positions and transactions associated with in-
tercompany debt between parents and foreign ﬁnancial aﬃliates that are
not depository institutions but are primarily engaged in ﬁnancial interme-
diation are reclassiﬁed from the direct investment accounts to the accounts
for US. nonbanking concerns’ transactions with unaﬃliated foreigners. Simi-
larly, interest receipts and payments associated with these debt transactions
are reclassiﬁed from the direct investment income account to the otherpri-
vate income account. Other types of capital transactions—equity capital and
reinvested earnings—with these ﬁnancial intermediaries and the associated
earnings receipts continue to be classiﬁed as direct investment.
On the basis of these ﬂows, the BEA builds for each country and sector
receiving FDI from the US the historical capital stock. Taking account of
depreciation, this allows to compute the change in each country’s sectoral
capital stock that may be attributed to accumulated FDI of US origin. It
is this variable over the 1990s that we use as dependent variable. Among
the more than 100 countries for which immigration data is available, there
were only 55 countries for which we were able to calculate the change of FDI
8ﬁnanced capital formation between 1990 and 2000. We use GDP, GDP per
capita, and regional dummies for Europe and Latin America as controls, and
add interaction terms between regional dummies and migration variables to
make allowance for regional determinants of migration and FDI patterns.
Table 1 presents the list of countries.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the em-
pirical analysis. Number of observations per variable is 55 corresponding to
the number of countries for which we can construct our historical stock vari-
ables of emigration by schooling level and sectoral capital formation ﬁnanced
with FDI, where the host country of the US multinational corporation sub-
sidiaries is the country of origin of the US immigrant stocks. Let ∆Ks be the
change between 1990 and 2000 in the log of s capital stock (where henceforth
s = TOT,MAN,SER stands for total, manufacturing and services respec-
tively) ﬁnanced with FDI from US , Ks
1990 is the log of the historical s stock
in 1990 of capital ﬁnanced with FDI from the US, ∆Me is the change in
the 1990’s of the log of the stock of migrants in the US with e educational
attainment (where henceforth e = PRI,SEC,TER for primary, secondary
and tertiary respectively), and Me
1990 is the log of the stock of migrants in
the US in 1990 with e educational attainment. Over the decade aggregate
capital formation ﬁnanced by FDI in our sample of countries rose on average
by 117%. The corresponding ﬁgures for manufacturing and services were
133% and 351%. Even with this wide gap in growth between sectors by 2000
the average of capital stock, across the 55 countries in the sample, ﬁnanced
with FDI in services was half of that in manufacturing. The average stock
of US immigrants by country with only primary education declined by 19%
and with secondary education by 4%. In contrast, the number of migrants
with university education rose by 44% between 1990 and 2000. The initial
stocks by the three categories of highest educational attainment were roughly
similar in 1990. These observed trends are not particular to our sample. For
example, Figure 1 shows aggregate FDI, not just originated in the US, in-
ﬂows to various regions and there is a clear expansionary tendency across
the board. While the growth of FDI is more pronounced in some regions, it
is clearly not a localized phenomenom. At the same time, Figure 2 shows
changes in the skill composition, measured by schooling attainment, of mi-
grant stocks to diﬀerent destinations in OECD countries. The increase in
the share of university educated among immigrants observed in the US in
1990’s also happened in the Australia, Canada and the EU, and overall in
the OECD. Hence, while our constructions of capital and migrant stocks re-
9stricts our sample of countries, the temporal variation of the main variables
in the resulting sample accords with what is observed globally.
4 Empirical analysis
We specify a regression in diﬀerences to mitigate concerns about endogeneity
and simultaneity. In contrast to most empirical speciﬁcations on the deter-
minants of FDI inﬂows, our dependent variable is the rate of change of the
historical capital stock ﬁnanced via FDI inﬂows rather than the levels of FDI.
In standard analyses on FDI determinants with the explanatory variable ex-
pressed in levels, Tobit estimation is generally used to correct for censoring
of the dependent variable.5 In our set up, truncated distributions are not an
issue as growth of the capital stock is not restricted to be positive. At the
same time, there is a sample selection issue as we have to exclude countries
for which historical sectoral capital stocks ﬁnanced are missing. To the ex-
tent that missing values may be caused by lack of FDI inﬂows induced by
fundamentals in the potential recipient country, there may be a bias towards
substitutability as weak fundamentals simultaneously increase migration and
lower FDI.
As pointed out by Razin et al. (2004), lack of inﬂows may be induced
by lumpy sunk costs associated with investing in the potential host country.
If the costs do not change over time, they can be modelled as a ﬁxed eﬀect.
We account for such unobserved heterogeneity by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences.
At the same time, we incorporate variation in the educational attainment of
migrants, to proxy for heterogeneity in the skill composition of migration, and
hence our framework has a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences structure. We estimate
the following regressions using OLS:
∆Ki,t = X
0
i,t−1α0 + M
0
i,t−1β0 + ∆M
0
i,tβ1 + ²i
where ∆Ki,t is the change in the capital stock of country i that is ﬁnanced
with FDI from the US between 1990 and 2000, Xi,t−1 is a vector of control
variables including the lagged dependent variable, Mi,t−1 contains country i’s
5A recent and notable exception is Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004), where ﬂaws
with the use of Tobit estimation tehniques are highlighted. Coeﬃcients from Tobit re-
gressions are biased due to their failure to account for the fact that occurence of zeros in
reported FDI may reﬂect economic fundamentals, beyond boundary problems.
10stock of migrants in the US by educational attainment in 1990, the elements
of ∆Mi,t are the rates of change in the components by educational grade
completed US immigrant between 1990 and 2000, and the term ²i captures
measurement error.
Using this speciﬁcation we obtain the following results. Table 3 shows
the impact of emigration patterns on FDI inﬂows. For total FDI, we ob-
tain that unskilled migration is associated with rising future FDI. There is
also some indication, although less signiﬁcant, that brain drain is positively
correlated with ensuing capital inﬂows. On the one hand, the positive asso-
ciation between unskilled emigration and total FDI inﬂows to the workers’
origin country may relate to the revelation of information about high labor
force quality from observations of their work by multinational investors. On
the other hand, positive correlation of current total FDI inﬂows and past
emigration of those holding university degrees is consistent with brain drain
acting as a catalyst for the creation of international business networks.
For manufacturing FDI, we ﬁnd that inﬂows have a signiﬁcant positive as-
sociation with past emigration of university graduates from the multinational
corporation subsidiary’s host country to the home country. Also, current
FDI inﬂows from the US are negatively correlated with current emigration
by workers with secondary education to the US. At the same time, for Latin
American countries the evidence indicates a contemporaneous positive link
b e t w e e ne m i g r a t i o nt ot h eU Sb yt h o s ew i t hp r i m a r ya n dt e r t i a r ys c h o o l i n g
attainments and FDI inﬂows from the US. A 10% rise in the stock of univer-
sity educated migrants in the US was associated with a rise of a quarter of
a percentage point in the growth of capital in manufacturing ﬁnanced with
FDI to the migrants’ country of origin. On the other hand, a 10% increase
in emigration of workers with secondary education to the US over the 1990’s
is associated with a 7% lower capital formation in manufacturing ﬁnanced
with FDI from the US to the migrants’ origin country.
Finally, with respect to FDI inﬂows directed to the service sector we
ﬁnd evidence consistent with contemporaneous substitutability and dynamic
complementarity between skilled emigration to the US and FDI inﬂows from
the US to the service sector, while no signiﬁcant eﬀect was found for the
relationship between unskilled migration and FDI.A 10% rise in the stock
of university educated migrants in the US was associated with a rise of a
half of a percentage point in the growth of capital in manufacturing ﬁnanced
with FDI to the migrants’ country of origin. By contrast, a 1%i n c r e a s ei n
emigration of workers with secondary education to the US over the 1990’s is
11associated with a 3.5% lower capital formation in services ﬁnanced with FDI
from the US to the migrants’ origin country.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Since international factor ﬂows are jointly determined by technology deploy-
ment and endowment diﬀerentials, it is natural to study at the same time
capital and labor movements between countries. Yet, one potential determi-
nant of FDI which has rarely been studied is migration. The most obvious
link is that to match workers and vacancies which are in diﬀerent countries,
either employees have to relocate to where jobs are or investments need to
be undertaken to create jobs where potential employees are. In particular,
FDI will ﬂow to where the type of labor used intensively in production is
abundant. At the same time, other things equal, workers will supply their
labor services where the highest salary can be obtained. Through this mecha-
nism FDI and migration are substitute ways to match workers and employers
l o c a t e di nd i ﬀerent countries.
Another eﬀect that runs in the opposite direction is that migration might
facilitate the formation of the types of business links which lead to FDI
project deployment in a particular location. Hence, while emigration of work-
ers into a country may mitigate to some extent the incentive for FDI outﬂow
from the destination country of migrants to the origin country, the pres-
ence of migrants can be a catalyst to establish the required links to achieve
eﬃcient distribution, procurement, transportation and satisfaction of regu-
lations. An important barrier to a multinational corporation’s viability to
set up a subsidiary in a developing country can be uncertainty and transac-
tion costs. To the extent that migrants integrate to the business community,
a network can emerge whereby migrants liaise between potential investors
and partners (both private and public) in various aspects of setting up a
production facility in the country of origin of the migrant.
Hence, migration can facilitate in the long run the outﬂow of FDI from
the destination to the origin country. Through this mechanism FDI and mi-
gration complement each other. Whether brain drain is associated with a net
increase in FDI inﬂows or not is an empirical matter. We use bilateral data
of migration and FDI ﬂows, as well as other control variables. Our bench-
mark is a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation for FDI with country size
measures (e.g. GDP and GDP per capita) and regional indicators as control
12variables and the skill composition and change over time of emigration as ex-
planatory variables. We identify evidence consistent with contemporaneous
substitutability among FDI and migration as well as dynamic complemen-
tarity, especially among migrants with more schooling.
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Figure 1 – Regional  Trends of FDI Inflows in 1990’s 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 – Changes in migrant composition in 1990’s 
 
Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2004)  
Table 1 – Sample Description 
 
COUNTRY 
Canada 
Costa Rica 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Panama 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Dominican 
Republic 
Jamaica 
UK 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Peru 
Venezuela 
Denmark 
Finland 
Ireland 
Norway 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Austria 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Greece 
Portugal 
Italy 
Spain 
Egypt 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Israel  
Saudi Arabia 
Turkey 
United Arab 
Emirates 
India 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
China 
Hong Kong 
Japan 
Korea, South 
Taiwan 
Australia 
NewZealand 
US MIGRANTS 90 
738955 
33962 
137248 
68978 
2655997 
85871 
12269 
34320 
240489 
246067 
109576 
76980 
63204 
47710 
221260 
105098 
107990 
32467 
34447 
20461 
160778 
39979 
49442 
534328 
88999 
31495 
133623 
836475 
2277 
89854 
36278 
164968 
179840 
587275 
71503 
59216 
46442 
25718 
79396 
7013 
49398 
304.001 
346194 
35876 
17725 
745388 
8204 
61433 
462957 
98090 
288190 
405468 
179245 
37475 
13462 
US MIGRANTS 00 
809096 
52641 
323011 
176530 
6176253 
113209 
18908 
45789 
530197 
413887 
192558 
109345 
158859 
63862 
396371 
214765 
211137 
76021 
30292 
18825 
158979 
30728 
44626 
694618 
59581 
35753 
163848 
925822 
2987 
93938 
40060 
166200 
206218 
500449 
83440 
92273 
111871 
48236 
90856 
9823 
66627 
1322.002 
811189 
52032 
38298 
1198020 
16931 
97383 
830139 
166616 
375947 
4941 
258486 
51958 
18177 
FDI FINANCED CAPITAL 90 
69508 
252 
130 
262 
10313 
9289 
4004 
252 
529 
625 
5929 
2531 
14384 
1896 
1677 
280 
599 
1087 
1726 
544 
5894 
4909 
1787 
72707 
1113 
9464 
19164 
27609 
1697 
19120 
25099 
282 
897 
14063 
7868 
1231 
401 
775 
746 
1899 
522 
409 
372 
3207 
1466 
1355 
3975 
1790 
354 
6055 
22599 
2695 
2226 
15110 
3156 
FDI FINANCED CAPITAL 00 
128814 
1655 
907 
257 
37332 
29316 
2317 
1170 
813 
2354 
28514 
15646 
39033 
9451 
4606 
763 
3485 
9530 
5363 
1110 
33816 
5833 
22676 
241663 
2686 
19527 
38752 
50963 
25571 
117557 
55854 
637 
1888 
22392 
19846 
2344 
1237 
3245 
3386 
4225 
1356 
737 
1431 
8514 
7400 
2735 
25634 
6635 
9861 
26621 
59441 
8914 
7821 
35364 
3854 
 
Notes: Migration stocks reported in thousands of people and capital stocks reported in millions of 1990 US 
dollars with “90” variable suffix corresponding to year 1990 levels and “00” suffix to year 2000 levels. Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
Sectoral Capital Financed by FDI and Migrant Composition by Education:  
Stocks and flows  
 
 
VARIABLE 
 
MEAN 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION
 
MINIMUM 
 
MAXIMUM 
 
  K TOT  1.171053 
 
.6742091 -.54702  3.327045 
  K TOT1990 7.722503 
 
1.562444 
 
1.562444 
 
11.19419 
 
  K MAN  1.330517 
 
2.230985 
 
-1.425655 
 
12.62149 
 
  K MAN1990 5.768116 
 
3.591764 
 
-6.907755 
 
10.41253 
 
  K SER  3.519508 
 
4.707519 
 
-8.006368 
 
15.99219 
 
  K SER1990
  .9125442 
 
5.332361 
 
-6.907755 
 
7.990915 
 
  M PRI
  -.1950974 
 
.9222775 
 
-4.04217 
 
1.53527 
 
  M PRI1990
  8.825225 
 
2.796136 
 
-6.907755 
 
14.25432 
 
  M SEC  -.0451762 
 
1.831756 
 
-11.2772 
 
1.260745 
 
  M SEC1990
  10.09821 
 
1.602961 
 
4.369448 
 
13.53907 
 
  M TER  .4465127 
 
.6800715 
 
-4.009286 
 
1.770801 
 
  M TER1990 10.50365   
 
1.408626 5.416101  13.13872 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of observations per variable is 55 corresponding to the number of countries for which we can 
construct our historical stock variables of emigration by schooling level and sectoral capital formation 
financed with FDI, where the host country of the subsidiary is the country of origin of the migrant. 
   
 
Definitions: K s is change in the 1990’s in the log of s capital stock financed with FDI from US (where 
henceforth s = TOT, MAN and SER stands for total, manufacturing and services respectively), K s 1990 is 
the log of the historical s stock in 1990 of capital financed with FDI from the US,  M e is the change in 
the 1990’s of the log of the stock of migrants in the US with e educational attainment (where henceforth   
e = PRI, SEC and TER for primary, secondary and tertiary respectively), and M e 1990 is the log of the 
stock of migrants in the US in 1990 with e educational attainment. Table 3 – Emigration and FDI inflows 
 
Dep. Var.: growth in 
capital financed with FDI 
from the US in 1990’s 
(1) 
 
Total  
(2) 
 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
 
Services 
      
            Constant 
 
1.499236   
(.9434182)      
 
1.619913     
(1.961791)     
 
18.32049   
(5.938741)      
 
 GDP per capita of  
 host in 1990 (log) 
.105372   
(.038974) 
 
.319913       
(.061791)     
 
.091347     
(.051791)     
 
 GDP of host in 1990    
 (log) 
.199136     
(.079463)     
 
.569131       
(.232561)     
 
.013814     
(.006192)     
 
 KTOT1990  (log)  -.070537   
(.0758481)     
  
-- -- 
  KMAN1990  (log) 
 
--  -.3713256    
(.074652)     
 
-- 
 KSER1990  (log) 
 
-- --  0.001  (0.69) 
 MPRI1990  (log) 
 
.2162047   
(.0695231)      
 
.2096735   
(.3048121)      
 
-.3224105    
(1.02825)     
 
 MSEC1990  (log) 
 
-.5635226   
(.3495073)     
 
-.3314846    
(.683885)      
 
3.461478   
(2.331489)      
 
  MTER1990  (log) 
 
.4390899   
(.2437978)      
 
1.602782    
(.5472631)      
 
4.381484   
(1.805951)     
 
  M PRI (log diffs) 
 
.1512915   
(.2182103)      
 
.8442118    
(.4731091)      
 
2081284   
(1.197774)      
 
  M SEC (log diffs) 
 
-.0603085   
(.1366381)     
 
-.7071812   
(.2622901)     
 
.5721065   
(.9354538)      
 
   M TER (log diffs) 
 
-.0831427   
(.2677519)     
 
2308714   
(.55928993)      
 
-3.33648   
(1.637666)     
 
  Regional fixed    
  effects 
YES YES YES 
  Regional interaction 
  effects 
YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.3582 
 
0.5491 
 
 0.4976 
 
No. of observations 
 
55 55 55 
 
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variable definitions are as in Table 2. 